Framing design in Practice:
Making epistemological trouble: Third-paradigm HCI as successor science
Discussion
1. p 391.
As Harding (Harding, 1986) famously argues, a successor
science that takes feminist philosophy of science to its logical
conclusion will not be oriented towards establishing a new, stable
paradigm, but rather will develop a reflexive awareness of the limits
of knowledge practices as part of scientific practice itself.
2.
In considering the potential of the third paradigm to live up to
this feminist vision, we must recognize that HCI operates within a
pragmatic, industrial context that renders it more than a pure
search after knowledge.
3.
This notion of continuous reflexivity
is remarkably consonant with Harding’s call for a destabilizing
feminist successor science, but it simultaneously raises the specter (幽靈)
of an unproductive intellectual churn (攪乳器) in which margins are simply
brought to the center, codified, and then made marginal again.
4.
"Haraway’s conceptualization of situated knowledges, with its
emphasis on the articulation of mechanisms for the production
of knowledge as a foundation for engagement between varying
knowledge claims, may offer a way out. While Agre would argue
that knowledge arising from different metaphors is more or less
incommensurable (沒有同一標準), Haraway sees mutual engagement as possible
as long as we are explicit about the standpoint from which a particular knowledge claim comes and the methodology which is used
to generate it."
5.
"We note that taking this point of view seriously clouds our
description of the third paradigm. For example, we described one
of the epistemological shifts underlying the third paradigm as
moving from analytic, controlled forms of knowledge production
to hermeneutic, interpretive ones. Looked at from the vantagepoint (有利位置)
of Haraway’s situated knowledges, however, the situation is more
complex, since Haraway suggests that the problem is not the nature of the mechanism for generating knowledge but a recognition
of its fundamentally situated character. This suggests that a feminist take on third-paradigm HCI would put both analytic and hermeneutic approaches into dialogue."
6.
Rather than determining which methodology is best, this
suggests a need for continuing sensitivity to where methodologies
come from and adaptations to make them locally meaningful.
Conclusion
7.
First,
given Agre’s articulation of the need for reflexivity in technical
practice, feminist philosophy of science has provided us a lens to
become aware of how knowledge claims and forms are changing
within HCI. In particular, we argue that a new epistemological
framework is emerging across the landscape of HCI research which
takes as central the phenomenological situatedness of users,
designers, and researchers, a perspective closely tied to feminist
notions of standpoint epistemology.
8.
3rd paradigm 並不會有固定的方法論和產出, 重點是覺知
Second, feminist philosophy of science, having worked out the
implications of standpoint epistemology, suggests that, if the third
paradigm takes its own epistemological commitments seriously, it
will not lead to a stable paradigm with clearly defined methodologies and outcomes, but must remain aware of and questioning its limits as a knowledge practice.
9. p. 392
全篇大重點: 研究必須交代 , 處理 認識論
This development suggests that we
as a field need to engage in discussion of epistemological issues as
a first-order part of technical practice, i.e. as regular research
papers.
10.
Second, since the mechanisms by which
knowledge is produced are crucial for its evaluation, research
papers should not only mention what methods were used but also
articulate how and why methods are applied.
11.
Black-boxing methods – i.e. turning them into recipes that can be applied without
understanding, sometimes articulated in HCI as improving their
ease of use by practitioners in the field – is inappropriate, since
we need to know how knowledge was generated in order to be able
to weigh it. So, for example, making critical technical practice itself
a mechanically reproducible method is probably ill-conceived.
12.
對user 地位, voice 等等的持續覺知.
The theory of situated knowledges calls for
special awareness of voices which are marginalized.
...
Feminism suggests no easy
answers to this difficulty, but emphasizes continuing awareness
of its existence and systematic questioning of the ways in which
users are represented in particular projects.
3.4 Epistemological trouble-making in the third paradigm
13. p. 390
Feminist philosophers argue that standpoint epistemology
leads to substantially changed epistemological commitments.
Within HCI, we can see the difference that standpoint epistemology makes in many of the qualities of feminist HCI identified by
Bardzell (2010):
- The quality of pluralism involves a shift from universal knowledge claims to multiple, particular knowledge claims, including a shift in central object of study from the ‘typical’ user to including marginal users.
- The quality of participation involves a shift from a distant, God’s-eye view on the subjects under study to active participation with those under study in the construction of knowledge.
- The quality of advocacy challenges HCI researchers to move from positions of apparent neutrality with respect to what they study to politically informed advocacy and engagement.
- The quality of ecology moves the scene of knowledge creation from controlled, artificial situations to holistic, complex contexts.
- The quality of self-disclosure echoes Haraway’s articulation of situated knowledges by suggesting a shift from hidden to exposed mechanisms for generating conclusions about users.
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